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Abstract—This paper considers dyadic-exchange networks in
which individual agents autonomously form coalitions of size two
and agree on how to split a transferable utility. Valid results for
this game include stable (if agents have no unilateral incentive to
deviate), balanced (if matched agents obtain similar benefits from
collaborating), or Nash (both stable and balanced) outcomes. We
design provably-correct continuous-time algorithms to find each
of these classes of outcomes in a distributed way. Our algorithmic
design to find Nash bargaining solutions builds on the other two
algorithms by having the dynamics for finding stable outcomes
feeding into the one for finding balanced ones. Our technical
approach to establish convergence and robustness combines
notions and tools from optimization, graph theory, nonsmooth
analysis, and Lyapunov stability theory and provides a useful
framework for further extensions. We illustrate our results in
a wireless communication scenario where single-antenna devices
have the possibility of working as 2-antenna virtual devices to
improve channel capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networked systems, characterized by distributed interac-
tions among multiple components and across several layers,
are pervasive in modern engineering problems and also model
various biological, economic, and sociological processes. Our
motivation in this work is driven by resource-constrained
networks where collaboration between subsystems gives rise
to a more efficient use of the resources. To this end, we
view each subsystem as a player in a coalitional game where
neighboring players seek to form a match (i.e., a coalition
of size two) and split the corresponding transferable utility
between the matched agents. Our aim is to synthesize dis-
tributed bargaining mechanisms that agents can employ to
decide with whom to collaborate with and how to allocate
the utility. Our interest in distributed strategies is motivated
by the inherent limitations posed by the network structure,
privacy concerns, and scalability and robustness considerations
for implementation.
Literature review. Examples of networked systems where
performance benefits arise from agents cooperating with each
other towards the achievement of a common goal are by
now pervasive, see e.g. [1], [2], [3] and references therein.
Of particular relevance to this paper are scenarios where
individual agents have the ability to carry out their objectives
satisfactorily by themselves, but performance can be improved
by collaborating with others. Examples are also numerous and
include resource allocation in communication networks [4],
[5], [6], formation creation in networks of UAVs [7], network
security [8], mobile robot coordination [9], large-scale data
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processing [10], and applications in sociology [11] and eco-
nomics [12]. Bargaining problems of the type considered here
are posed on dyadic-exchange networks, so called because
agents can match with at most one other agent [13]. Bipartite
matching and assignment problems [14] are special cases of
the dyadic-exchange network. Nash bargaining outcomes are
an extension to multi-player games of the classical two-player
Nash bargaining solution [15]. The works [16], [17] develop
centralized methods for finding such outcomes. In terms of
distributed implementations, the work [18] provides a discrete-
time dynamics that, given a matching, converges to balanced
allocations and [19] provides a discrete-time dynamics that
converges to Nash outcomes (without considering dynamics
separately for stable or balanced outcomes). With respect to
these works, an important novelty of the present manuscript is
the dynamics and control perspective on this class of problems,
which allows us to develop a principled technical approach to
the study of asymptotic convergence and robustness. Another
area of connection with the literature is the body of research on
distributed algorithms for solving linear programs [20], [21],
including the authors’ previous work [22]. Our algorithmic
design to find stable outcomes builds on the distributed algo-
rithm proposed in [22] because of its mild requirements for
guaranteeing convergence and its robustness properties against
disturbances.
Statement of contributions. We consider dyadic-exchange
networks where individual agents bargain with one another
about whom to match with and how to allocate the transferable
utility associated to a matching. For this scenario, the type of
outcomes we are interested in are Nash bargaining solutions,
which combine the notion of stability and fairness. A stable
outcome is one where none of the agents benefit by unilaterally
deviating from their match. A balanced outcome is one where
matched agents benefit equally from the match, where benefit
is defined as the next-best allocation that an agent could
achieve by a unilateral deviation. The main contribution of the
paper is the design of provably-correct distributed continuous-
time dynamics that find each of these classes of outcomes.
The problem of finding stable outcomes is combinatorial
in the number of edges in the network. Nevertheless, we
build on the correspondence between the existence of stable
outcomes and the solutions of a linear programming relaxation
for the maximum weight matching problem on the graph
to synthesize a distributed algorithm that determines stable
outcomes. Regarding balanced outcomes, we note how finding
them requires each pair of matched agents to solve a system
of coupled nonlinear equations. Based on this observation, we
define local (with respect to 2-hop information) error functions
that measure how far matched agents’ allocations are from
being balanced. Our proposed distributed algorithm has then
agents adjust their allocations based on their balancing errors.
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2Finally, we interconnect the two aforementioned dynamics to
synthesize a distributed algorithm that finds Nash bargaining
solutions. We show how the ‘stable outcome’ part of the dy-
namics allows agents to guess in a distributed way with whom
to match and that this prediction becomes correct in finite time.
Based on this prediction, the ‘balanced outcome’ part of the
dynamics asymptotically converges to a Nash outcome. As
a byproduct of the systems and control perspective adopted
here, we also assess the robustness properties of the proposed
distributed algorithm against small perturbations. Our tech-
nical approach combines notions and tools from distributed
linear programming, graph theory, nonsmooth analysis, and
Lyapunov stability techniques. We conclude by applying our
results to a wireless communication scenario in which multiple
devices send data to a base station according to a time division
multiple access protocol. Devices may share their transmission
time slots in order to gain an improved channel capacity.
Simulation results show how agents find a Nash outcome in a
distributed way, yielding fair capacity improvements for each
matched device and a network-wide capacity improvement of
around 16%.
Organization. Section II introduces notation and back-
ground material used throughout the paper. Section III intro-
duces the problem of designing distributed algorithms to find
stable, balanced, and Nash outcomes. Sections IV, V, and VI
provide, respectively, our algorithmic solutions for each of
these classes of outcomes. Section VII presents simulations
results and finally Section VIII gathers our conclusions and
ideas for future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces basic preliminaries on notation, non-
smooth analysis, set-valued dynamical systems, and distributed
linear programming.
A. Notation
We denote the set of real and nonnegative real numbers by
R and R≥0, respectively. For a set X ⊆ Rn, its intersection
with the nonnegative orthant is denoted X+ := X ∩ Rn≥0.
This notation is applied analogously to vectors and scalars.
For x ∈ Rn, we use x ≥ 0 (resp. x > 0) to mean that all
components of x are nonnegative (resp. positive). We let S¯
denote the closure of the set S. Given sets S1 and S2, S1 \S2
denotes the complement of S2 in S1. A set S ⊆ Rn is convex
if it fully contains the segment connecting any two points in
S. The set B(x, δ) ⊆ Rn is the open ball centered at x ∈ Rn
with radius δ > 0. We use the shorthand notation S +B(0, δ)
to denote the union ∪x∈SB(x, δ). Given a matrix A ∈ Rn×m,
we let Ai denote the ith row of A and ai,j its (i, j) element.
B. Nonsmooth analysis
Here we review some basic notions from nonsmooth analy-
sis following [23]. A function f : Rn → R is locally Lipschitz
at x ∈ Rn if there exist δx > 0 and Lx ≥ 0 such that
‖f(y1) − f(y2)‖ ≤ Lx‖y1 − y2‖ for y1, y2 ∈ B(x, δx). We
refer to f simply as locally Lipschitz if f is locally Lipschitz
at all x ∈ Rn. A locally Lipschitz function is differentiable
almost everywhere. Letting Ωf ⊆ Rn be the set of points
where the locally Lipschitz function f is not differentiable,
the generalized gradient of f at x ∈ Rn is
∂f(x) = co
{
lim
i→∞
∇f(xi) : xi → x, xi /∈ S ∪ Ωf
}
,
where co{·} denotes the convex hull and S ⊆ Rn is any set
with zero Lebesgue measure. We use ∂xg(x, y) and ∂xg(x, y)
to denote the generalized gradient of the maps x 7→ g(x, y)
and y 7→ g(x, y), respectively.
A set-valued map F : Rn ⇒ Rn maps elements in Rn
to subsets of Rn. A set-valued map F is locally bounded if
for every x ∈ Rn there exists an  > 0 such that F (B(x, ))
is bounded. A set-valued map F is upper semi-continuous if
for all x ∈ Rn and  ≥ 0, there exists δx ≥ 0 such that
F (y) ⊆ F (x) + B(0, ) for all y ∈ B(x, δx). Given a locally
Lipschitz function f : Rn → R, the generalized gradient map
x 7→ ∂f(x) is a locally bounded and upper semi-continuous
set-valued map. Moreover, ∂f(x) is nonempty, convex, and
compact for all x ∈ Rn.
C. Set-valued dynamical systems
We present here basic notions on set-valued dynamical
systems following the exposition of [24]. A time-invariant
set-valued dynamical system is represented by the differential
inclusion
x˙ ∈ F (x), (1)
where F : X ⊆ Rn ⇒ Rn is a set-valued map. If F is locally
bounded, upper semi-continuous and takes nonempty, convex,
and compact values, then, from any initial condition, there
exists an absolutely continuous curve x : R≥0 → X (called
trajectory or solution) satisfying (1) almost everywhere. The
set of equilibria of F is {x ∈ X : 0 ∈ F (x)}. A set M
is weakly positively invariant with respect to F if, for any
x0 ∈ M, M contains at least one maximal solution (that is,
one that cannot be extended forward in time) of x˙ ∈ F (x)
with initial condition x0. The set-valued Lie derivative of a
locally Lipschitz function V : Rn → R along F at x ∈ Rn is
defined as
LFV (x) = {a ∈ R : ∃v ∈ F (x) s.t. vT ζ = a ∀ζ ∈ ∂V (x)}.
One can show that, if LFV (x) ⊆ (−∞, 0] for all x ∈ Rn,
then V is non-increasing along the trajectories of (1).
The following result helps establish the asymptotic conver-
gence properties of (1).
Theorem II.1 (Set-valued LaSalle Invariance Principle).
Assume V : Rn → R is differentiable, the trajectories
of (1) are bounded, and F is locally bounded, upper semi-
continuous and takes nonempty, convex, and compact values.
If LFV (x) ⊆ (−∞, 0] for all x ∈ X , then any trajectory t 7→
x(t) of (1) starting in X converges to the largest weakly pos-
itively invariant set M contained in {x ∈ X : 0 ∈ LFV (x)}.
3Set-valued dynamical systems are a helpful tool in under-
standing the solutions of a differential equation
x˙ = f(x), (2)
when f : Rn → Rn is discontinuous. Formally, let Sf denote
the set of points where f is discontinuous. Define the Filippov
set-valued map F [f ] : Rn ⇒ Rn by
F [f ](x) := co{ lim
i→∞
f(xi) : xi → x, xi /∈ Sf
}
, (3)
where co{·} denotes the closed convex hull. If f is measurable
and locally bounded, then F [f ] is locally bounded, upper
semi-continuous and takes nonempty, convex, and compact
values. In such case, a solution t 7→ x(t) of (2) in the Filippov
sense is a solution to x˙ ∈ F [f ](x).
D. Distributed linear programming
Our review here of distributed linear programming follows
closely the exposition in [25], [22]. A standard form linear
program is given by
min{cTx : Ax = b, x ≥ 0}, (4)
where c ∈ Rn, An×m, and b ∈ Rm. Its dual is
max{−bT z : AT z ≥ c}. (5)
The point (x∗, z∗) ∈ Rn × Rm satisfies the KKT conditions
for (4) if
Ax∗ = b, x∗ ≥ 0, AT z∗ ≥ c, and (AT z∗ + c)Tx∗ = 0.
When (4) has a finite optimal value, x∗ (resp. z∗) is a solution
to (4) (resp. the dual (5)) if and only if (x∗, z∗) satisfies the
KKT conditions for (4).
We have proposed in [22] the following continuous-time
dynamics to solve the linear program (4),
x˙i =
{
fi(x, z), if xi > 0,
max{0, fi(x, z)}, if xi = 0,
(6a)
z˙ = Ax− b, (6b)
where the nominal flow function, f : Rn × Rm → Rn, is
defined by
f = −c−AT (Ax− b+ z). (7)
The convergence properties of this dynamics are captured in
the following result.
Theorem II.2 (Convergence to a solution of a linear pro-
gram). Let t → (x(t), z(t)) be a trajectory of (6) starting
from an initial point in Rn≥0 × Rm. Then, if (4) has a finite
optimal value, the following limit exists
lim
t→∞(x(t), z(t)) = (x
∗, z∗),
where x∗ (resp. z∗) is a solution to (4) (resp. the dual of (4)).
In addition to the asymptotic convergence of (7) stated
in Theorem II.2, here we mention two additional impor-
tant properties of this dynamics: it is robust to disturbances
(specifically, integral input-to-state stable) and amenable to
distributed implementation. We elaborate on the latter next, as
it is relevant for the main developments of the paper. Suppose
that each component of x ∈ Rn corresponds to the state of
an independent decision maker or agent. In order for agent
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} to be able to implement its corresponding
dynamics in (6a), it needs access to the following data and
states:
(i) ci ∈ R,
(ii) every b` ∈ R for which a`,i 6= 0,
(iii) the non-zero elements of every row of A for which the
ith component, a`,i, is non-zero,
(iv) the states of every agent j ∈ {1, . . . , n} where a`,i 6= 0
and a`,j 6= 0 for some ` ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and
(v) every z` for which a`,i 6= 0.
The agents j for which a`,i 6= 0 and a`,j 6= 0 for some ` ∈
{1, . . . ,m} (as in (iv) above) are called neighbors of i, denoted
N (i). Also, the states z` are auxiliary states whose dynamics
can, based on locally available data and states, be implemented
by any agent i for which a`,i 6= 0.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The main objective of the paper is the design of provably
correct distributed dynamics that solve the network bargain-
ing game. This section provides a formal description of the
problem. We begin by presenting the model for the group of
agents and then recall various important notions of outcome
for the network bargaining game.
Let G = (V, E ,W ) be an undirected weighted graph where
V = {1, . . . , n} is a set of vertices, E ⊆ V × V is a set of
edges, and W ∈ R|E|≥0 is a vector of edge weights indexed by
edges in G. In an exchange network, vertices correspond to
agents (or players) and edges connect agents who have the
ability to negotiate with each other. The set of agents that i
can negotiate with are its neighbors and is denoted by N (i) :=
{j : (i, j) ∈ E}. Edge weights represent a transferable utility
that agents may, should they come to an agreement, divide
between them. Here, we assume that the network is a dyadic-
exchange network, meaning that agents can pair with at most
one other agent. Agents are selfish and seek to maximize the
amount they receive. However if two agents i and j cannot
come to an agreement, they forfeit the entire amount wi,j . We
consider bargaining outcomes of the following form.
Definition III.1 (Outcomes). A matching M ⊆ E is a subset
of edges without common vertices. An outcome is a pair
(M,α), where M ⊆ E is a matching and α ∈ Rn is an
allocation to each agent such that αi+αj = wi,j if (i, j) ∈M
and αk = 0 if agent k is not part of any edge in M . •
In any given outcome (M,α), an agent may decide to
unilaterally deviate by matching with another neighbor. As an
example, suppose that (i, j) ∈ M and agent k is a neighbor
of i. If αi + αk < wi,k, then there is an incentive for i to
deviate because it could receive an increased allocation of
αˆi = wi,k−αk > αi. Such a deviation is unilateral because k’s
allocation stays constant. Conversely, if αi + αk ≥ wi,k, then
i does not have an incentive to deviate by matching with k.
4This discussion motivates the notion of a stable outcome, in
which no agent benefits from a unilateral deviation.
Definition III.2 (Stable outcome). An outcome (M,αs) is
stable if αs ≥ 0 and
αsi + α
s
j ≥ wi,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E . •
Given an arbitrary matching M , it is not always possible
to find allocations αs such that (M,αs) is a stable outcome.
Thus, finding stable outcomes requires to find an appropriate
matching as well, making the problem combinatorial in the
number of possible matchings.
Stable outcomes are not necessarily fair between matched
agents, and this motivates the notion of balanced outcomes.
As an example, again assume that the outcome (M,αb) is
given and that (i, j) ∈ M . The best allocation that i could
expect to receive by matching with a neighbor other than j is
bai\j(αb) = max
k∈N (i)\j
{wi,k − αbk}+.
Moreover, the set (possibly empty) of best neighbors with
whom i could receive this allocation is
bni\j(αb) = argmaxk∈N (i)\j{wi,k − αbk}+.
Then, if agent i were to unilaterally deviate from the outcome
and match instead with k ∈ bni\j , the resulting benefit of this
deviation would be
bai\j(αb)− αbi .
When the benefit of a deviation is the same for both i and j,
we call the outcome balanced.
Definition III.3 (Balanced outcome). An outcome (M,αb)
is balanced if for all (i, j) ∈M ,
bai\j(αb)− αbi = baj\i(αb)− αbj . •
From its definition, it is easy to see that the main challenge
in finding balanced outcomes is the fact that the allocations
must satisfy a system of nonlinear (in fact, piecewise linear)
equations, coupled between agents. Of course, outcomes that
are both stable and balanced are desirable and what we seek
in this paper. Such outcomes are called Nash.
Definition III.4 (Nash outcome). An outcome (M,αN ) is
Nash if it is stable and balanced. •
Figure 1 shows an example of each outcome, highlighting
their various attributes.
The problem we aim to solve is to develop distributed
dynamics that converge to each of the class of outcomes
defined above: stable, balanced, and Nash. We refer to a
dynamics as 1-hop distributed, or simply distributed, over G
if its implementation requires each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} only
knowing (i) the states of 1-hop neighboring agents and (ii)
the utilities wi,j for each j ∈ N (i). Likewise, we refer to a
dynamics as 2-hop distributed over G if its implementation
requires each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} only knowing (i) the states
of 1- and 2-hop neighboring agents and (ii) the utilities wi,j
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Fig. 1. For each outcome, matched agents are connected with thicker
grey edges, dotted edges connect agents who decided not to match, and
allocations are indicated by arrows. In the stable outcome, the 0 allocation is
unfair to that node since its partner receives the whole edge weight. In the
balanced outcome, agents can receive higher allocations by deviating from
their matches. Nash outcomes do not exhibit either of these shortcomings.
and wj,k for each j ∈ N (i) and k ∈ N (j). As agents’
allocations evolve in the dynamics that follow, the quantity
wi,j − αi(t) has the interpretation of “i’s offer to j at time
t”, thus motivating the terminology bargaining in exchange
networks.
IV. DISTRIBUTED DYNAMICS TO FIND STABLE OUTCOMES
In this section, we propose a distributed dynamics to find
stable outcomes in network bargaining. Our strategy to achieve
this builds on a reformulation of the problem of finding a stable
outcome in terms of finding the solutions to a linear program.
A. Stable outcomes as solutions of linear program
Here we relate the existence of stable outcomes to the
solutions of a linear programming relaxation for the maximum
weight matching problem. This reformulation allows us later
to synthesize a distributed dynamics to find stable outcomes.
Our discussion here follows [16], but because that reference
does not present formal proofs of the results we need, we
include them here for completeness.
We begin by recalling the formulation of the maximum
weight matching problem on G. Essentially, this corresponds
to a matching in which the sum of the edge weights in the
matching is maximal. Formally, for every (i, j) ∈ E we use
variables mi,j ∈ {0, 1} to indicate whether (i, j) is in the
maximum weight matching (i.e., mi,j = 1) or not (mi,j = 0).
Then, the solutions of the following integer program can be
used to deduce a maximum weight matching,
max
∑
(i,j)∈Ewi,jmi,j (8a)
s.t.
∑
j∈N (i)mi,j ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ V, (8b)
mi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (8c)
The constraints (8b) ensure that each agent is matched to at
most one other agent. If m∗ ∈ {0, 1}|E| is a solution (indexed
by edges in G) to the above optimization problem, then a
maximum weight matching is well-defined by the relationship
(i, j) ∈ M ⇔ m∗i,j = 1. Since (8) is combinatorial in the
5number of edges in the graph due to constraint (8c), we are
interested in studying its linear programming relaxation,
max
∑
(i,j)∈Ewi,jmi,j
s.t.
∑
j∈N (i)mi,j ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ V, (9)
mi,j ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E ,
and its associated dual
min
∑
i∈Vα
s
i
s.t. αsi + α
s
j ≥ wi,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E , (10)
αsi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ V.
Arguing with the KKT conditions for the relaxation (9), the
following result states that when a stable outcome (M,αs)
exists, the matching M is a maximum weight matching on G.
Lemma IV.1 (Maximum weight matchings and stable out-
comes [16]). Suppose that a stable outcome (M,αs) exists for
a given graph G. Then M is a maximum weight matching.
Proof: Our proof method is to encode the matching
M using the indicator variables m ∈ {0, 1}|E| and then
show that m is a solution of the maximum weight matching
problem (8). To begin, for all (i, j) ∈ E , let mi,j = 1 if
(i, j) ∈ M and zero otherwise. Use m to denote the vector
of mi,j , indexed by edges in G. Then m is feasible for the
relaxation (9). By definition of outcome, cf. Definition III.1,
it holds that mi,j(αsi + α
s
j − wi,j) = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E and
αsi (1 −
∑
j∈N (i)mi,j) = 0 for all i ∈ V . In other words,
complementary slackness is satisfied. Also, note that αs is
feasible for the dual (10). This means that (m,αs) satisfy the
KKT conditions for (9) and so m is a solution of (9). Since
m is integral, it is also a solution of (8) implying that M is a
maximum weight matching. This completes the proof.
Building on this result, we show next that the existence of
stable outcomes is directly related to the existence of integral
solutions of the linear programming relaxation (9).
Lemma IV.2 (Existence of stable outcomes [16]). A stable
outcome exists for the graph G if and only if (9) admits
an integral solution. Moreover, if G admits a stable outcome
and m∗ ∈ {0, 1}|E| is a solution to (9), then (M,αs,∗) is a
stable outcome where the matching M is well-defined by the
implication
(i, j) ∈M ⇔ m∗i,j = 1, (11)
and αs,∗ is a solution to (10).
Proof: The proof of Lemma IV.1 revealed that, if a stable
outcome exists, (9) admits an integral solution. Let us prove
the other direction. By assumption, (9) yields an integral
solution m∗ ∈ {0, 1}|E| and let αs,∗ be a solution to the
dual (10). We induce the following matching: (i, j) ∈ M
if m∗i,j = 1 and (i, j) /∈ M otherwise. By complementary
slackness, m∗i,j(α
s,∗
i + α
s,∗
j − wi,j) = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E and
αs,∗i (1 −
∑
j∈N (i)m
∗
i,j) = 0 for all i ∈ V . Then, it must be
that m∗i,j = 1 implies that α
s,∗
i + α
s,∗
j = wi,j and α
s,∗
i = 0
if i is not part of any matching. Thus, (M,αs,∗) is a valid
outcome. Next, αs,∗ must be feasible for (10), which reveals
that it is a stable allocation. Therefore, (M,αs,∗) is a stable
outcome. This completes the proof.
B. Stable outcomes via distributed linear programming
Since we are interested in finding stable outcomes, from
here on we make the standing assumption that one exists
and that the maximum weight matching is unique. Besides
its technical implications, requiring uniqueness has a practical
motivation and is a standard assumption in exchange network
bargaining. For example, if an agent has two equally good
alternatives, it is unclear with whom it will choose to match
with. It turns out that the set of graphs for which a unique
maximum weight matching exists is open and dense in the set
of graphs that admit a stable outcome, further justifying the
assumption of uniqueness of the maximum weight matching.
Given the result in Lemma IV.2 above, finding a stable
outcome is a matter of solving the relaxed maximum weight
matching problem, where the matching is induced from the
solution of (9) and the allocation is a solution to (10). Our
next step is to put (10) in standard form by introducing slack
variables si,j for each (i, j) ∈ E ,
min
∑
i∈Vα
s
i
s.t. αsi + α
s
j − si,j = wi,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E ,
αsi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ V,
si,j ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E .
We use the notation s to represent the vector of slacks indexed
by edges in G. In the dynamics that follow, the variables s and
m will be states. Thus, as a convention, we assume that each
si,j and mi,j are states of agent min{i, j}. This means that
the state of agent i ∈ V is
(αsi , {si,j}j∈N+(i), {mi,j}j∈N+(i))
∈ R≥0 × R|N
+(i)|
≥0 × R|N
+(i)|,
where, for convenience, we denote by N+(i) := {j ∈ N (i) :
i < j} the set of neighbors of i whose identity is greater
than i.
Next, using the dynamics (6) of Section II-D to solve the
linear program above results in the following dynamics for
agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
α˙si =
{
fαi (α
s, s,m), αsi > 0,
max{0, fαi (αs, s,m)}, αsi = 0,
(13a)
and, for each j ∈ N+(i)
s˙i,j =
{
fsi,j(α
s, s,m), si,j > 0,
max{0, fsi,j(αs, s,m)}, si,j = 0,
(13b)
m˙i,j = α
s
i + α
s
j − si,j − wi,j , (13c)
where
fαi (α
s, s,m) := −1−
∑
j∈N (i)
[
mi,j + α
s
i + α
s
j − si,j − wi,j
]
,
6and
fsi,j(α
s, s,m) := −mi,j − αsi − αsj + si,j + wi,j ,
are derived from (7). The next result reveals how this dynamics
can be used as a distributed algorithm to find stable outcomes.
Proposition IV.3 (Convergence to stable outcomes). Given
a graph G, let t→ (αs(t), s(t),m(t)) be a trajectory of (13)
starting from an initial point in Rn≥0 × R|E|≥0 × R|E|. Then the
following limit exists
lim
t→∞(α
s(t), s(t),m(t)) = (α∗, s∗,m∗),
where (αs,∗, s∗) (resp. m∗) is a solution to (10) (resp. (9)).
Moreover, if a stable outcome exists, a maximum weight
matching M is well-defined by the implication
(i, j) ∈M ⇔ m∗i,j = 1,
and (M,αs,∗) is a stable outcome. Finally, the dynamics (13)
is distributed over G.
The proof of the above results follows directly from The-
orem II.2, Lemma IV.2, and the assumptions made on the
information available to each agent.
V. DISTRIBUTED DYNAMICS TO FIND BALANCED
OUTCOMES
In this section, we introduce distributed dynamics that
converge to balanced outcomes. Our starting point is the
availability of a matching M to the network, i.e., each agent
already knows if it is matched and who its partner is. Hence,
the dynamics focuses on negotiating the allocations to find a
balanced one. We drop this assumption later when considering
Nash outcomes.
Our algorithm design is based on the observation that the
condition αbi + α
b
j = wi,j for (i, j) ∈ M that defines an
allowable allocation for an outcome and the balance condition
in Definition III.3 for two matched agents can be equivalently
stated as
0=αbi−
1
2
(wi,j+ bai\j(αb)− baj\i(αb)) =: ebi (αb), (14a)
0=αbj−
1
2
(wi,j− bai\j(αb)+ baj\i(αb)) =: ebj(αb). (14b)
We refer to ebi , e
b
j : Rn → R as the errors with respect to
satisfying the balance condition of i and j, respectively. For an
unmatched agent k, we define ebk = α
b
k. We refer to e
b(αb) ∈
Rn as the vector of balancing errors for a given allocation.
Based on the observation above, we propose the following
distributed dynamics whereby agents adjust their allocations
proportionally to their balancing errors,
α˙b = −eb(αb). (15)
An important fact to note is that the equilibria of the above
dynamics are, by construction, allocations in a balanced out-
come. Also, note that (15) is continuous and requires agents
to know 2-hop information, because for its pair of matched
agents (i, j) ∈ M , agent i updates its own allocation (and
hence its offer to j) based on baj\i.
The following result establishes the boundedness of the
balancing errors under (15) and is useful later in establishing
the asymptotic convergence of this dynamics to an allocation
in a balanced outcome with matching M .
Proposition V.1 (Balancing errors are bounded). Given a
matching M , let t 7→ αb(t) be a trajectory of (15) starting
from any point in Rn. Then
t 7→ V (eb(αb(t))) := 12 maxi∈V (e
b
i (α
b(t)))2
is non-increasing. Thus, t 7→ eb(αb(t)) lies in a bounded set.
Proof: Our proof strategy is to compute, for each i ∈ V ,
the Lie derivative of ebi along the trajectories of (15). Based
on these Lie derivatives, we introduce a new dynamics whose
trajectories contain t 7→ eb(αb(t)) and establish the result
reasoning with it.
Since ebi is locally Lipschitz, it is differentiable almost
everywhere. Let Ωi ⊆ Rn be the set, of measure zero, of
allocations for which ebi is not differentiable. If i is matched,
say (i, j) ∈ M , then Ωi is precisely the set of allocations
where at least one of the next best neighbor sets bni\j(αb)
or bnj\i(αb) have more than one element. If i is unmatched,
then Ωi = ∅. Then, whenever αb ∈ Rn \ Ωi, it is easy to see
that for every i ∈ V ,
L−ebebi (αb) =

−ebi (αb), if i is unmatched or
if bni\j(αb) = ∅
and bnj\i(αb) = ∅
−ebi (αb) + 12ebτ (αb), if bni\j(αb) = τ
and bnj\i(αb) = ∅
−ebi (αb)− 12ebκ(αb), if bni\j(αb) = ∅
and bnj\i(αb) = κ
−ebi (αb) + 12ebτ (αb) − 12ebκ(αb),
if bni\j(αb) = τ
and bnj\i(αb) = κ.
This observation motivates our study of the dynamics
ξ˙i =

−ξi, if i is unmatched or
if bni\j(ω) = ∅
and bnj\i(ω) = ∅
−ξi + 12ξτ , if bni\j(ω) = τ
and bnj\i(ω) = ∅
−ξi − 12ξκ, if bni\j(ω) = ∅
and bnj\i(ω) = κ
−ξi + 12ξτ − 12ξκ, if bni\j(ω) = τ
and bnj\i(ω) = κ.
(16a)
ω˙i = −ξi (16b)
for every i ∈ V , defined on Rn × (Rn \ Ω), where Ω :=
∪i∈VΩi. For convenience, we use the shorthand notation
F = (F 1, F 2) : Rn × (Rn \ Ω) → Rn × Rn to refer to (16).
Note that F is piecewise continuous (because F 1 is piecewise
continuous, while F 2 is continuous). Therefore, we understand
its trajectories in the sense of Filippov. Using (3), we compute
7the Filippov set-valued map, defined on Rn × Rn, for any
matched i and (ξ, ω) ∈ Rn × Rn, as
F [F 1i ](ξ, ω) =
{
− ξi − 12
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω)
λiτξτ +
1
2
∑
κ∈bnj\i(ω)
µiκξκ :
λi ∈ Rn≥0 is s.t.
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω)
λiτ = 1 if bni\j(ω) 6= ∅
and µi ∈ Rn≥0 is s.t.
∑
κ∈bnj\i(ω)
µiκ = 1 if bnj\i(ω) 6= ∅
}
.
Here, we make the convention that the empty sum is zero.
If i is unmatched, then F [F 1i ](ξ, ω) = {−ξi}. Furthermore,
F [F 2i ] = {−ξi} for all i ∈ V . Based on the discussion so far,
we know that t 7→ (eb(αb(t)), αb(t)) is a Filippov trajectory
of (16) with initial condition (eb(αb(0)), αb(0)) ∈ Rn × Rn.
Thus, to prove the result, it is sufficient to establish the
monotonicity of
V (ξ) = max
i∈V
1
2
ξ2i ,
along (16). For notational purposes, we denote
M(ξ) := argmaxi∈V
1
2
ξ2i .
The generalized gradient of V is
∂V (ξ) =
{ ∑
i∈M(ξ)
ηihiξi : η ∈ Rn≥0 s.t.
∑
i∈M(ξ)
ηi = 1
}
,
where hi ∈ Rn is the unit vector with 1 in its ith component
and 0 elsewhere. Then, the set-valued Lie derivative of V
along F [F ] is given in (17). To upper bound the element in
LF [F ]V (ξ), note that
− 12
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω)
λiτξiξτ ≤ 14
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω)
λiτ (ξ
2
i + ξ
2
τ ),
where we have used the inequality ab ≤ 12a2 + 12b2 for a, b ∈
R. For
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω) λ
i
τ = 1 and i ∈M(ξ) (that is ξ2i ≥ ξ2τ for
all τ ∈ bni\j(ω)), we can further refine the bound as,
1
2
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω)
λiτξiξτ ≤ 12ξ2i ,
The analogous bound
1
2
∑
κ∈bnj\i(ω)
µiκξiξκ ≤ 12ξ2i ,
can be derived similarly if
∑
κ∈bnj\i(ω) µ
i
κ = 1 and i ∈M(ξ).
Using these bounds in the Lie derivative (17) and noting that∑
i∈M(ξ) ηi = 1, it is straightforward to see that for any
element a ∈ LF [F ]V (ξ) it holds that a ≤ 0. It follows that
t 7→ V (ξ(t)) and thus t 7→ V (eb(αb(t))) is non-increasing
and t 7→ eb(αb(t)) lies in the bounded set V −1(eb(αb(0))),
which completes the proof.
The next result establishes the local stability of the balanced
allocations associated with a given matching and plays a
key role later in establishing the global asymptotic pointwise
convergence of the dynamics (15).
Proposition V.2 (Local stability of each balanced alloca-
tion). Given a matching M ⊆ E , let BM = {αb,∗ ∈
Rn | (M,αb,∗) is a balanced outcome}. Then every alloca-
tion in BM is locally stable under the dynamics (15).
Proof: Take an arbitrary balanced allocation αb,∗ ∈ BM
and consider the change of coordinates α˜b = αb −αb,∗. Then
˙˜αb = −eb(α˜b + αb,∗).
For brevity, denote this dynamics F˜ : Rn → Rn. We compute
the Lie derivative of
V (α˜b) =
1
2
max
i∈V
(α˜bi )
2,
along F˜ . The derivation is very similar the one used in the
proof of Proposition V.1,
LF˜V (α˜b) =
{
a ∈ R : a = −
∑
i∈M(α˜b)
λiα˜
b
ie
b
i (α˜
b + α˜b,∗),
for all λ ∈ Rn≥0 s.t.
∑
i∈M(α˜b)
λi = 1
}
,
where
M(α˜b) :=
1
2
argmaxi∈V(α˜
b
i )
2.
LF [F ]V (ξ) = {a ∈ R : there exists v ∈ F [F ](ξ, ω) s.t. a = ζT v for all ζ ∈ ∂V (ξ)}
=
{
a ∈ R : for each i ∈ V there exists λi ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω)
λiτ = 1 if bni\j(ω) 6= ∅ and µi ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑
κ∈bnj\i(ω)
µiκ = 1 if
bnj\i(ω) 6= ∅ s.t. a=
(∑
i∈V
hi
[
−ξi − 12
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω)
λiτξτ +
1
2
∑
κ∈bnj\i(ω)
µiκξκ
])T( ∑
i∈M(ξ)
ηihiξi
)
for all η ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑
i∈M(ξ)
ηi = 1
}
=
{
a ∈ R : for each i ∈M(ξ) there exists λi ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω)
λiτ = 1 if bni\j(ω) 6= ∅ and µi ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑
κ∈bnj\i(ω)
µiκ = 1 if
bnj\i(ω) 6= ∅ s.t. a =
∑
i∈M(ξ)
ηi
(
− ξ2i − 12
∑
τ∈bni\j(ω)
λiτξiξτ +
1
2
∑
κ∈bnj\i(ω)
µiκξiξκ
)
for all η ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑
i∈M(ξ)
ηi = 1
}
. (17)
8Consider one of the specific summands −α˜biebi (α˜b +αb,∗) for
some i ∈M(α˜b). For (i, j) ∈ M , take τ ∈ bni\j(α˜b + αb,∗)
and κ ∈ bnj\i(α˜b + αb,∗) so that we can write,
−α˜biebi (α˜b + α˜b,∗) = −α˜bi (α˜bi + αb,∗i − 12 (wi,j + wi,τ − α˜bτ
− αb,∗τ − wj,κ + α˜bκ + αb,∗κ )).
Now, according to Lemma A.1, there exists  > 0 such that,
for all (k, l) ∈ E , we have
bnk\l(α˜b + αb,∗) = bnk\l(αb) ⊆ bnk\l(αb,∗),
for all αb such that ‖α˜b‖ = ‖αb − αb,∗‖ < . Therefore,
for such allocations, we have τ ∈ bni\j(αb,∗) and κ ∈
bnj\i(αb,∗), and hence
−α˜biebi (α˜b + α˜b,∗)
= −α˜bi (α˜bi + 12 α˜bτ − 12 α˜bκ + ebi (αb,∗))
= −(α˜bi )2 − 12 α˜bi α˜bτ + 12 α˜bi α˜bκ
≤ −(α˜bi )2 + 14 (α˜bi )2 + 14 (α˜bτ )2 + 14 (α˜bi )2 + 14 (α˜bκ)2 ≤ 0,
where we have used the fact that αb,∗ ∈ BM in the second
equality, the inequality ab ≤ 12a2+ 12b2 for a, b ∈ R in the first
inequality and the fact that i ∈ M(α˜b) in the last inequality.
Thus a ≤ 0 for each a ∈ LF˜ V˜ (α˜b) when ‖α˜b‖ ≤ , which
means that α˜b = 0 is locally stable. In the original coordinates,
αb = αb,∗ is locally stable. Since αb,∗ is arbitrary, we deduce
that every allocation in BM is locally stable.
The boundedness of the balancing errors together with the
local stability of the balanced allocations under the dynamics
allow us to employ the LaSalle Invariance Principle, cf.
Theorem II.1 in the proof of the next result and establish the
pointwise convergence of the dynamics to an allocation in a
balanced outcome with matching M .
Proposition V.3 (Convergence to a balanced outcome).
Given a matching M , let t → αb(t) be a trajectory of (13)
starting from an initial point in Rn. Then t 7→ (M,αb(t))
converges to a balanced outcome. Moreover, the dynamics (15)
is distributed with respect to 2-hop neighborhoods over G.
Proof: Note that, for each pair of matched agents (i, j) ∈
M , the sum α˙bi + α˙
b
j = wi,j − (αbi + αbj), implying that
αbi (t) + α
b
j(t)→ wi,j exponentially fast. For each unmatched
agent k, one has that α˙bk = −αbk, implying that αbi (t) → 0
exponentially fast. Therefore, it follows that t 7→ (M,αb(t))
converges to the set of (valid) outcomes. It remains to further
show that it converges to the set of balanced outcomes. Follow-
ing the approach employed in the proof of Proposition V.1, we
argue with the trajectories of (16), which we showed contain
the trajectory t 7→ eb(αb(t)). For matched agents (i, j) ∈M ,
ξ˙i + ξ˙j = −(ξi + ξj), (18)
under the dynamics (16). Interestingly, this dynamics is inde-
pendent of ω. Thus, using the Lyapunov function
V˜ (ξ) = 12
∑
(i,j)∈M
(ξi + ξj)
2 + 12
∑
{i∈V:
i is unmatched}
(ξi)
2,
it is trivial to see that
LF [F ]V˜ (ξ) = −
∑
(i,j)∈M
(ξi + ξj)
2 −
∑
{i∈V:
i is unmatched}
(ξi)
2,
which, again, is independent of ω. By the boundedness of
t 7→ ξ(t) established in Proposition V.1, and using V˜ , we
are now able to apply the LaSalle Invariance Principle, cf.
Theorem II.1, which asserts that the trajectory t 7→ ξ(t)
converges to the largest weakly positively invariant set M
contained in
L : = {ξ ∈ Rn : LF [F ]V˜ (ξ) = 0}
= {ξ ∈ Rn : ξi = −ξj , ∀(i, j) ∈M,
and ξi = 0 if i is unmatched}.
Incidentally, this set is closed already which is why we
omit the closure operator. We next show, using the fact that
t 7→ V (ξ(t)) is non-increasing (cf. Proposition V.1) and the
weak invariance of M, that in fact M = {0}. Take a point
ξ ∈ M ⊆ L and take an i ∈ M(ξ). If i is unmatched, then
ξi = 0 already and the proof would be complete. So, assume
(i, j) ∈ M for some j ∈ V . Then, ξj = −ξi and it also
holds that ξ˙i = −ξ˙j (see e.g., (18)). In fact, it must be that
ξ˙i = ξ˙j = 0, otherwise one of ξi or ξj would be increasing,
which would contradict t 7→ V (ξ(t)) being non-increasing. If
bni\j(ω) = bnj\i(ω) = ∅ then 0 = ξ˙i = −ξi = ξj , which
would complete the proof. Suppose then that τ = bni\j(ω)
and bnj\i(ω) = ∅. Then 0 = ξ˙i = −ξi + 12ξτ , which
contradicts i ∈ M(ξ) (unless of course ξi = 0, which would
complete the proof). A similar argument holds if bni\j(ω) = ∅
and bnj\i(ω) = κ. The final case is if bni\j(ω) = τ and
bnj\i(ω) = κ. In this case, 0 = ξ˙i = −ξi + 12ξτ − 12ξκ. So as
not to contradict i ∈ M(ξ), it must be that ξi = −ξτ = ξκ,
which means that τ, κ ∈ M(ξ) as well. Therefore, using the
same argument we used for i, it must be that 0 = ξ˙τ = ξ˙κ.
Assume without loss of generality that ξτ is strictly negative
(if it were zero the proof would be complete and if it were
positive we could argue instead with ξκ). This means that ξτ
grows larger at a constant rate since ω˙τ = −ξτ . At some
time, it would happen that ωτ > wi,τ , which would make
bni\j(ω) = ∅. This corresponds to a case we previously
considered where we showed that, so as not to contradict
the monotonicity of t 7→ V (ξ(t)) it must be that ξi = 0.
In summary, M = {0} ⊂ Rn, so ξ(t) → 0. By construction
of the dynamics (16) it follows that eb(αb(t)) → 0 which
means, by construction of eb, that (M,αb(t)) converges to the
set of balanced outcomes. This, along with the local stability
of each balanced allocation (cf. Proposition V.2) is sufficient
to ensure pointwise convergence to a balanced outcome [26,
Proposition 2.2]. Finally, it is clear from (15) that the dynamics
is distributed with respect to 2-hop neighborhoods, which
completes the proof.
VI. DISTRIBUTED DYNAMICS TO FIND NASH OUTCOMES
In this section, we combine the previous developments to
propose distributed dynamics that converge to Nash outcomes.
The design of this dynamics is inspired by the following result
9from [18] revealing that balanced outcomes associated with
maximum weight matchings are stable.
Proposition VI.1 (Balanced implies stable). Let M be a
maximum weight matching on G and suppose that G admits a
stable outcome. Then, a balanced outcome of the form (M,αb)
is also stable, and thus Nash.
In a nutshell, our proposed dynamics combine the fact that
(i) the distributed dynamics (13) of Section IV allow agents
to determine a maximum weight matching and (ii) given such
a maximum weight matching, the distributed dynamics (15)
of Section V converge to balanced outcomes. The combina-
tion of these facts with Proposition VI.1 yields the desired
convergence to Nash outcomes.
When putting the two dynamics together, however, one
should note that the convergence of (13) is asymptotic, and
hence agents implement (15) before the final stable matching
is realized. To do this, we have agents guess with whom (if
any) they will be matched in the final Nash outcome. An agent
i guesses that it will match with j ∈ N (i) if the current value
of the matching state mi,j(t) coming from the dynamics (13)
is closest to 1 as compared to all other neighbors in N (i) \ j.
As we show later, this guess becomes correct in finite time.
Formally, agent i predicts its partner by computing
Pi(m)={j ∈ N (i) : |mi,j − 1|< |mi,k − 1|,∀k ∈ N (i)\j}.
Clearly, Pi(m) is at most a singleton and can be computed
by i using local information. If Pi(m) = {j}, we use the
slight abuse of notation and write Pi(m) = j.
With the above discussion in mind, we next propose the
following distributed strategy: each agent i ∈ V implements
its corresponding dynamics in (13) to find a stable outcome
but only begins balancing its allocation if, for some j ∈ N (i),
agents i and j identify each other as partners. Formally, this
dynamics is represented by, for each i ∈ V ,
α˙si =
{
fαi (α
s, s,m), αsi > 0,
max{0, fαi (αs, s,m)}, αsi = 0,
(19a)
α˙bi =

− ebi (αb), if for some j ∈ N (i),
Pi(m) = j and Pj(m) = i,
− αbi , otherwise,
(19b)
and, for each j ∈ N+(i),
s˙i,j =
{
fsi,j(α
s, s,m), si,j > 0,
max{0, fsi,j(αs, s,m)}, si,j = 0,
(19c)
m˙i,j = α
s
i + α
s
j − si,j − wi,j . (19d)
The state of agent i ∈ V is then
(αsi , α
b
i , {si,j}j∈N+(i), {mi,j}j∈N+(i))
∈ R≥0 × R× R|N
+(i)|
≥0 × R|N
+(i)|.
For convenience, we denote the dynamics (19) by
FNash :Rn≥0×Rn×R|E|≥0×R|E| → Rn≥0× Rn×R|E|≥0×R|E|.
The dynamics (19) can be viewed as a cascade system, with the
states m feeding into the balancing dynamics (19b). The next
result establishes the asymptotic convergence of this cascade
system.
Theorem VI.2 (Asymptotic convergence to Nash out-
comes). Let t → (αs(t), αb(t), s(t),m(t)) be a trajectory
of (19) starting from an initial point in Rn≥0×Rn×R|E|≥0×R|E|.
Then, if there exists a stable outcome, for some T > 0
the maximum weight matching M is well-defined by the
implication
(i, j) ∈M ⇔ Pi(m(t)) = j and Pj(m(t)) = i.
for all t ≥ T . Furthermore, t 7→ (M,αb(t)) converges to a
Nash outcome. Moreover, (19) is distributed with respect to
2-hop neighborhoods over G.
Proof: Let m∗ ∈ R|E| be the unique integral solution
of (9). The asymptotic convergence properties of (13), cf.
Proposition IV.3, guarantee that, for every  > 0, there exists
T > 0 such that, for all t ≥ T ,
 >
{
|mi,j(t)− 1|, if m∗i,j = 1,
|mi,j(t)|, if m∗i,j = 0.
Thus, taking  < 12 , it is straightforward to see that the
matching induced by the implication
(i, j) ∈M ⇔ Pi(m(t)) = j and Pj(m(t)) = i,
is well-defined, a maximum weight matching, and constant
for all t ≥ T . Then, considering only t ≥ T and applying
Propositions V.3 and VI.1, we deduce that t 7→ (M,αb(t))
converges to a Nash outcome. The fact that (19) is distributed
with respect to 2-hop neighborhoods follows from its defini-
tion, which completes the proof.
Finally, we comment on the robustness properties of the
Nash bargaining dynamics (19) against perturbations such as
communication noise, measurement error, modeling uncertain-
ties, or disturbances. A central motivation for using the linear
programming dynamics (6), and continuous-time dynamics
in general, is that there exist various established robustness
characterizations for them. In particular, using previously
established results from [22], it holds that (19) is a ‘well-
posed’ dynamics, as defined in [27]. As a straightforward
consequence of [27, Theorem 7.21], the Nash bargaining
dynamics is robust to small perturbations, as we state next.
Corollary VI.3 (Robustness to small perturbations). Given
a graph G, assume there exists a stable outcome and let
t → (αs(t), αb(t), s(t),m(t)) be a trajectory, starting from
an initial point in Rn≥0 × Rn × R|E|≥0 × R|E|, of the perturbed
dynamics
(α˙s, α˙b, s˙, m˙) = FNash(αs+d1, α
b+d2, s+d3,m+d4)+d5
where d1, d2 : R≥0 7→ Rn, d3, d4 : R≥0 7→ R|E|, and
d5 : R≥0 7→ R2n+2|E| are disturbances. Then, for every
 > 0, there exist δ, T > 0 such that, for maxi ‖di‖∞ < δ,
the maximum weight matching M is well-defined by the
implication
(i, j) ∈M ⇔ Pi(m(t)) = j and Pj(m(t)) = i,
10
for all t ≥ T , and t 7→ (M,αb(t)) converges to an -
neighborhood of the set of Nash outcomes of G.
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Fig. 2. Spatial distribution of devices {1, . . . , 5} and the base station (BS).
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Fig. 4. The bargaining graph resulting from the position and TDMA
transmission time allocations for each device. Here, we have taken Pmax = 3.
VII. APPLICATION TO MULTI-USER WIRELESS
COMMUNICATION
In this section, we provide some simulation results of our
proposed Nash bargaining dynamics as applied to a multi-user
wireless communication scenario. The scenario we describe
here is a simplified version of the one found in [28], and
we direct the reader to that reference for a more detailed
discussion on the model. We assume that there are n = 5
single antenna devices distributed spatially in an environment
that send data to a fixed base station. We denote the position
of device i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} as xi ∈ R2 and we assume without
loss of generality that the base station is located at the origin.
Figure 2 illustrates the position of the devices. An individual
device’s transmission is managed using a time division multi-
ple access (TDMA) protocol. That is, each device i is assigned
a certain percentage ρi of a transmission period of length T
in which it is allowed to transmit as specified in Figure 3.
We use a commonly used model for the capacity ci > 0 of
the communication channel from device i to the base station,
which is a function of their relative distance,
ci = log(1 + |xi|−1).
In the above, we have taken various physical parameters (such
as transmit power constraints, path loss constants, and others)
to be 1 for the sake of presentation. Since i only transmits for
ρi percent of each transmission period, the effective capacity
of the channel from device i to base station is ρici. It is well-
known in wireless communication [29] that multiple antenna
devices can improve the channel capacity. Thus, devices i and
j may decide to share their data and transmit a multiplexed
data signal in both i and j’s allocated time slots. In essence, i
and j would behave as a single virtual 2-antenna device. The
resulting channel capacity is given by
ci,j = log(1 + |xi|−1 + |xj |−1),
which is greater than both ci and cj . However, there is a cost
to agent i and j cooperating in this way because their data must
be transmitted to each other. We assume that the device-to-
device transmissions do not interfere with the device-to-base
station transmissions. The power needed to transmit between
i and j is given by
Pi,j = |xi − xj |.
If this power is larger than some Pmax > 0, then i and j will
not share their data. We can model this scenario via a graph
G = (V, E ,W ), where V = {1, . . . , 5} are the devices, edges
correspond to whether or not i and j are willing, based on the
power requirements, to share their data
(i, j) ∈ E ⇔ Pi,j ≤ Pmax,
and the edge weights represent the increase in effective chan-
nel capacity should devices cooperate,
wi,j = (ρi + ρj)ci,j − ρici − ρjcj , ∀(i, j) ∈ E .
Figure 4 shows this graph, using the data for the scenario we
consider. It is interesting to note that, besides channel capacity
and power constraints, one could incorporate other factors into
the edge weight definition. For example, if privacy is a concern
in the network, then devices may be less likely to share their
data with untrustworthy devices which can be modeled by a
smaller edge weight.
TABLE I
IMPROVEMENTS IN CAPACITY DUE TO COLLABORATION
Effective channel Increase in effective %
Device capacity without channel capacity improve-
collaboration, ci in Nash outcome, αbi ment
1 0.288 0 0
2 0.288 0.113 39.2
3 0.693 0.06 8.7
4 0.693 0.079 11.4
5 0.406 0.074 18.2
{1,. . . ,5} 0.441 0.070 15.8
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Fig. 5. Evolution of each device’s allocation and the matching states in dynamics (19). At various times (i.e., t ≈ 4 and 9), certain devices change who they
identify as partners in the matching which explains the kinks in the trajectories at those times. This occurs because of the evolution of the matching states in
(b) and devices cannot correctly deduce the stable matching until t ≈ 9. The final convergence of the matching states to {0, 1}|E| (which we do not show
for the sake of presentation) takes much longer than devices need to accurately identify a Nash outcome.
1 2 3
4
5
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0.079
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0.133
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0.127
Fig. 6. Nash outcome that is distributedly computed by devices. Device
matchings are shown by thicker grey edges and allocations to each device are
indicated with arrows
A matching M in the context of this setting corresponds
to disjoint pairs of devices that decide to share their data
and transmission time slots in order to achieve a higher
effective channel capacity. An allocation corresponds to how
the resulting improved bit rate is divided between matched
devices. For example, if i is allocated an amount of αbi , then i
and j will transmit their data such that i’s data reaches the base
station at a rate of ci+αbi . The percent improvement in bit rate
for i is then given by αbi/ci. Devices use the dynamics (19) to
find, in a distributed way, a Nash outcome for this problem.
Figure 5 reveals the resulting state trajectories and Figure 6
displays the final Nash outcome. The percent improvements
resulting from collaboration for each device are collected in
Table I. The last row in this table show that the network-wide
improvement is 15.8%. Before bargaining, devices 1 and 2
have the lowest individual channel capacities and would thus
greatly benefit from collaboration. However, due to power
constraints, device 1 can only match with device 2, who in
turn prefers to match with device 3. This explains why, in
the end, device 1 is left unmatched. Figure 7 illustrates how
convergence is still achieved when noise is present in the
devices’ dynamics, as forecasted by Corollary VI.3.
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Fig. 7. When the devices’ dynamics are subjected to noise (normally
distributed with zero mean and standard deviation 0.01), the stable matchings
are still correctly deduced and devices’ allocations converge to a neighborhood
of the allocations in the Nash outcome.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have considered bargaining in dyadic-exchange net-
works, where individual agents decide with whom (if any) to
match and agree on an allocation of a common good. For such
scenarios, valid notions of outcomes include stable, balanced,
and Nash. We have designed provably correct distributed dy-
namics that asymptotically converge to each of these classes of
outcomes. Our technical approach combines graph- and game-
theoretic notions with techniques from set-valued dynamics,
stability theory, and distributed linear programming. We have
illustrated the performance of the proposed coordination al-
gorithm in a wireless communication scenario, where we
showed how agent collaborations can, in a fair way, improve
both individual and network-wide performance. Future work
will include considering other solution concepts on dyadic-
exchange networks and applying our techniques to multi-
exchange networks (i.e., allowing coalitions of more than two).
In addition, we would like to study the rate of convergence and
establish more quantifiable robustness properties of balancing
dynamics; in particular, the effects of time delays, adversarial
agents, and dynamically changing system data. Finally, we
wish to apply our dynamics to other coordination tasks and
implement them on a multi-agent testbed.
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APPENDIX
The following result is used in the proof of Proposition V.2
to establish the local stability of each balanced allocation under
the dynamics (15).
Lemma A.1 (Upper-semicontinuity of the next-best-
neighbor sets map). Let αb,∗ ∈ Rn. Then there exists  > 0
such that, for all (i, j) ∈ E and all ‖αb − αb,∗‖ < , the
following inclusion holds
bni\j(αb) ⊆ bni\j(αb,∗).
Proof: Note that, since the number of edges is finite, it
is enough to prove that such  exists for each edge (i, j) ∈
E (because then one takes the minimum over all of them).
Therefore, let (i, j) ∈ E and, arguing by contradiction, assume
that for every  > 0, there exists αb with ‖αb − αb,∗‖ < 
such that bni\j(αb) 6⊆ bni\j(αb,∗). Equivalently, suppose that
{αb,k}∞k=1 is a sequence converging to αb,∗ such that, for every
k, there exists a τk ∈ bni\j(αb,k)\bni\j(αb,∗). By definition
of the next-best-neighbor set, it must be that
wi,τk − αb,kτk ≥ wi,τ − αb,kτ ,
for all τ ∈ N (i) \ j. Since N (i) \ j has a finite number of
elements, there must be some τˆ ∈ N (i) such that τk = τˆ
infinitely often. Therefore, let {k`}∞`=1 be a subsequence such
that τk` = τˆ for all `. Then
wi,τˆ − αb,k`τˆ ≥ wi,τ − αb,k`τ ,
for all τ ∈ N (i) \ j. Taking now the limit as `→∞,
wi,τˆ − αb,∗τˆ ≥ wi,τ − αb,∗τ ,
for all τ ∈ N (i) \ j, which contradicts τˆ /∈ bni\j(αb,∗).
